Biosecurity a No-Go
In March of 2004, the US Dept of Health and Human Services announced the formation of a new National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. The aim of the board was to advise feds on research of “dual use” – science that could be used as a weapon. This was meant to prevent terrorists from seeing information that they could transform into bioweapons while still not impeding – too much – the flow of information in the sciences.
“The NSABB will have up to 25 voting members, to be appointed by the HHS Secretary in consultation with the heads of relevant federal departments and agencies. Members will be experts in a broad range of fields, including molecular biology, microbiology, infectious diseases, laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, public health/epidemiology, health physics, pharmaceutical production, veterinary medicine, plant health, food production, bioethics, national security, biodefense, intelligence, law and law enforcement, and scientific publishing. The Board will also include nonvoting ex officio members from at least 15 federal departments and agencies.”
Those of you interested in national security might be interested to know that (according to The Scientist at least):
The board has never met
Members haven’t been chosen
Professional staff is not in place
The Board was meant to self-police scientists – to prevent the federal government from more draconian measures such as outlawing publication or classifying it as secret.
With perhaps the most anti-science administration in our history, and the threat of bioweapons clearly recognized, this is a very odd thing.